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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals is conferred with jurisdiction over 
the instant appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) 
(2002) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the district court misinterpreted the Utah 
Supreme Court's decision in Manning v. State and the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure in the course of denying Mr. Paolone's Motion 
for reinstatement of the denied right to appeal. Questions 
involving a trial court's interpretation of common law and rules 
are questions of law that the appellate court is well-suited to 
address, thus giving no deference to the lower court. See 
Trujillo v. Jenkins, 840 P.2d 777, 778-79 (Utah 1992); State v. 
Richardson, 843 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (stating that 
"we consider the trial court's interpretation of binding case law 
as presenting a question of law and review the trial court's 
interpretation of that law for correctness."); Loporto v. 
Hoegemann, 982 P. 2d 586, 587 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (quoting 
Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State, 888 P.2d 694, 697 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994, cert, denied, 899 P.2d 12,31 (Utah 1995)). 
Preservation of Issue Citation or Statement of Grounds for Review: 
Mr. Paolone preserved this issue by way of his Motion for 
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Reinstatement of Direct Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc set forth at R. 160-
63. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, 
regulations, or case law whose interpretation is determinative, 
are set out verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body 
and arguments of the instant Brief of Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves a misinterpretation of the Utah Supreme 
Court's decision in Manning v. State as well as the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. These misinterpretations, as demonstrated 
below, denied Mr. Paolone of his constitutional right to an 
appeal. 
The State charged Defendant with one count of Forcible Sexual 
Abuse, a second-degree felony. Defendant subsequently appeared 
before the trial court for a jury trial. That same day the jury 
returned a verdict of guilty. The court ordered a presentence 
investigation report and set sentencing. 
Shortly thereafter, Defendant wrote a letter addressed to the 
trial court, requesting, among other things, an appeal on the 
conviction of Forcible Sexual Abuse. The trial court responded, 
"You are free to represent yourself at the Sentencing Hearing July 
2 
31, 1996 @ 9:00 am. That is the only matter before this Court. 
A copy of your letter will be given to Judge Dawson for his 
information as he is the Judge who will hear the other cases." 
Defendant's letter was filed in another case pending before Judge 
Dawson. 
The trial court sentenced Defendant to an indeterminate term 
of one to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison to run 
consecutive to the sentences imposed in Case Nos. 961700440 and 
961700441. 
On October 25, 2005, Defendant filed a Motion for 
Reinstatement of Direct Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc. Defendant also 
filed a Motion for Appointment of Counsel for Motion to Reinstate 
Appeal. 
On November 16, 2005, the district issued a Ruling on 
Defendant's Motions for Reinstatement of Direct Appeal Nunc Pro 
Tunc and Appointment of Counsel, denying the Motions. Mr. Paolone 
forwarded a timely pro se Notice of Appeal to the district court, 
which was filed on December 16, 2005. 
On April 5, 2 006, this Court temporarily remanded the case to 
the district court for a determination of Mr. Paolone's indigency 
status and, if appropriate, for the appointment of counsel. On 
remand, the district court found Mr. Paolone indigent and 
appointed the undersigned as appellate counsel. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about March 21, 1996, the State charged Mr. 
Paolone with one count of Forcible Sexual Abuse, a second-degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-404(1) and 76-5-
406 (10) & (11) (R. 3) ,x 
2. On June 21, 1996, Mr. Paolone appeared before the trial 
court, Judge Michael G. Allphin, for a jury trial (R. 22). After 
its deliberation the afternoon of that same day, the jury returned 
a verdict of guilty (R. 23 and R. 55) . 
3 . The trial court ordered the preparation of a presentence 
investigation report, scheduling the sentencing for July 31, 1996 
(R. 192:115:6-8) . 
4. On July 8, 1996, Mr. Paolone wrote a letter addressed to 
Judge Allphin, discharging trial counsel, asserting his innocence, 
and requesting that he be allowed to represent himself in further 
proceedings (R. 3 97) . See Letter from Mr. Paolone to Judge 
Allphin, date stamped 07/19/96, a true and correct copy of which 
is attached hereto as Addendum A. Mr. Paolone concluded the 
letter "requesting a change of venue, a court appointed attny 
[sic] . . . and an appeal on the conviction of Forcible Sexual 
xThe record on appeal does not include the Information by which 
Mr. Paolone was charged. Consequently, the record citation is to the 
Warrant of Arrest and Affidavit in Support of Warrant of Arrest 
referencing the Information having been filed. 
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Abuse on the grounds of insufficient legal representation and 
biased jury." Id. at R. 399. 
5. Judge Allphin responded in writing to Mr. Paolone's 
letter, "You are free to represent yourself at the Sentencing 
Hearing July 31, 1996 @ 9:00 am. That is the only matter before 
this Court. A copy of your letter will be given to Judge Dawson 
for his information as he is the Judge who will hear the other 
cases."2 (R. 57). See Letter from Judge Dawson to Mr. Paolone, 
dated July 10, 1996, a true and correct copy of which is attached 
hereto as Addendum B. 
6. Although Mr. Paolone's letter requesting an appeal 
referenced the jury trial and conviction for Forcible Sexual 
Abuse, it was filed (R. 397-400) in another case pending before 
Judge Dawson. See State v. Paolone, Case No. 961700400 FS (R. 
362-440) . 
7. At sentencing on August 14, 1996, the trial court 
sentenced Mr. Paolone to an indeterminate term of one to fifteen 
years in the Utah State Prison to run consecutive to the sentences 
imposed in Case Nos. 961700440 and 961700441 (R. 73) . 
2At the same time as the instant case, Mr. Paolone had three 
other cases pending before Judge Glen R. Dawson. See State v. 
Paolone, Case No. 961700439 FS (R. 219-361), State v. Paolone, Case 
No. 961700440 FS (R. 362-430), and State v. Paolone, Case No. 
961700441 FS (R. 431-475). 
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8. In a second letter written by Judge Allphin to Mr. 
Paolone on December 16, 1996, regarding another matter, the court 
acknowledged that Mr. Paolone "raised the issue of an appeal to 
your criminal conviction." (R. 83). 
9. On October 25, 2005, Mr. Paolone filed a Motion for 
Reinstatement of Direct Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc (R. 160-63) . See 
Motion for Reinstatement of Direct Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc, R. 160-
63, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as 
Addendum C. 
10. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Paolone filed a Motion for 
Appointment of Counsel for Motion to Reinstate Direct Appeal (R. 
164-66). See Motion for Appointment of Counsel for Motion to 
Reinstate Direct Appeal, a true and correct copy of which is 
attached hereto as Addendum D. 
11. On November 16, 2005, the district issued a Ruling on 
Defendant's Motions for Reinstatement of Direct Appeal Nunc Pro 
Tunc and Appointment of Counsel, denying the Motions (R. 168-81) . 
See Ruling on Defendant's Motions for Reinstatement of Direct 
Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc and Appointment of Counsel, R. 168-81, a true 
and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum E. 
12. On or about November 23, 2 005, Mr. Paolone forwarded a 
timely pro se Notice of Appeal to the district court, which was 
filed on December 16, 2005 (R. 183-85) . See pro se Notice of 
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Appeal, R. 183-85, a true and correct copy of which is attached 
hereto as Addendum F. 
13. On April 5, 2006, this Court temporarily remanded the 
case to the district court for a determination of Mr. Paolone's 
indigency status and, if appropriate, for the appointment of 
counsel (R. 197) . 
14. On remand, the district court found Mr. Paolone indigent 
and appointed the undersigned as counsel on appeal (R. 198-99). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The district court misinterpreted the Utah Supreme 
Court's decision in Manning v. State in the course of denying Mr. 
Paolone's Motion for reinstatement of the denied right to appeal. 
Not only did the court misinterpret Manning, but it misinterpreted 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure in the course of denying the 
Motion. 
The second exception or circumstance cited in Manning applies 
in the instant case. Mr. Paolone diligently but futilely 
attempted to appeal within the statutory time frame without fault 
on defendant's part. 
The district court misinterpreted Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 4 in the course of denying Mr. Paolone's Motion by 
concluding that Mr. Paolone's pro se notice of appeal was untimely 
7 
because it was received by the court after Mr. Paolone was 
convicted but before he was sentenced. By so ruling, the district 
court ignored subsection (c) of Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. Finally, the district court's determination 
that Mr. Paolone's pro se notice of appeal was invalid because it 
was sent to the trial judge rather than the clerk was unduly 
restrictive and ran afoul of the liberal treatment to be applied 
to notices of appeal, especially those filed by pro se litigants. 
The failure to provide a direct appeal from a criminal case 
implicates the guarantee of due process under the Utah 
Constitution. In the instant case, Mr. Paolone was denied his 
constitutional right to appeal by the erroneous filing and failure 
by the court to adjudicate the pro se notice of appeal. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT MISINTERPRETED THE UTAH 
SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN MANNING v. STATE 
AND THE UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN 
THE COURSE OF DENYING MR. PAOLONE'S MOTION 
FOR REINSTATEMENT OF THE DENIED RIGHT TO 
APPEAL. 
A. The Manning Remedy 
In Manning v. State, 2005 UT 61, 122 P. 3d 628, the Utah 
Supreme Court "erected a sturdier, less contrived framework for a 
defendant who has been unconstitutionally denied his right to 
appeal to refresh his opportunity to perfect his appeal.7' State 
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v. Rees, 2005 UT 69, 1(13, 125 P. 3d 874. In Manning, the Utah 
Supreme Court "filled the void created by the demise of the 
Johnson post-conviction hearing procedure with a procedure crafted 
in no small measure of parts taken from the writ of error coram 
nobis, most prominently its guarantee of appointed counsel." Id. 
at 1fl4. The purpose of the Manning remedy is to "provide a 
readily accessible and procedurally simple method by which persons 
improperly denied their right to appeal can promptly exercise this 
right." Manning, 2005 UT 61 at f26. Moreover, the purpose of the 
remedy is to protect the constitutional right to a criminal appeal 
"in all cases." See Utah Const, art. I, § 12.3 
In Manning, the Utah Supreme Court held that 
[U]pon a defendant's motion the trial or 
sentencing court may reinstate the time frame 
for filing a direct appeal where the 
defendant can prove, based on facts in the 
record or determined through additional 
evidentiary hearings, that he has been 
unconstitutionally deprived, through no fault 
of his own, of his right to appeal. Such 
circumstances would include: (1) the 
defendant asked his or her attorney to file 
an appeal but the attorney, after agreeing to 
file, failed to do so, see Johnson, 635 P.2d 
36; (2) the defendant diligently but futilely 
attempted to appeal within the statutory time 
frame without fault on defendant's part, see 
id.; or (3) the court or the defendant's 
attorney failed to properly advise defendant 
3Article I, section 12, of the Utah Constitution states that 
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have . . . the 
right to appeal in all cases." 
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of the right to appeal, see State v. Hallett, 
856 P.2d 1060, 1061 (Utah 1993).4 
Manning, 2005 UT 61 at f31. " [T]he defendant must demonstrate by 
a 'preponderance of evidence' that [he or] she qualifies for any 
of the exceptions listed above." Id. at 1(32 (citing Sullivan v. 
Turner, 22 Utah 2d 85, 448 P.2d 907, 910 (1968)). If the 
defendant succeeds, "the trial or sentencing court is directed to 
reinstate the appeal time frame if doing so is in the interest of 
fundamental fairness." Id. 
B. The District Court's Ruling 
In the case at bar, the district court, by virtue of a 
tortured interpretation of insignificant distinctions in facts 
between Manning and this case, initially concluded that Manning 
"is not directly on point." See Ruling on Defendant's Motions for 
Reinstatement of Direct Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc and Appointment of 
Counsel, R. 174. In addition, the district court concluded that 
Mr. Paolone "cannot meet his burden because if [Mr. Paolone] was 
deprived of this right to appeal at all, it was due to [Mr. 
Paolone's] delay in properly filing a notice of appeal." Id. 
The "second exception" or "circumstance" cited in Manning 
applies in the instant case. See Manning v. State, 2005 UT 66, 
4The Utah Supreme Court, by footnote to this quotation from the 
Manning case, noted "that this list is not intended to be exclusive." 
Manning v. State, 2005 UT 61, 1(31 n.ll, 122 P.3d 628. 
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1(31, 122 P.2d 628. By filing his pro se letter or notice of 
appeal on or about July 8, 1996, Mr. Paolone diligently attempted 
to appeal within the statutory time frame by informing the 
district court, in no uncertain terms, of his desire to appeal the 
conviction of Forcible Sexual Abuse. See Utah R. App. P. 4(c) .5 
The court forwarded the pro se notice of appeal letter to the 
clerk for filing, who apparently filed the appeal letter in the 
wrong case. 
The district court also misinterpreted Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 4 in the course of denying Mr. Paolone's Motion for 
reinstatement of denied right to appeal. A district court's 
interpretation of a rule is a question of law reviewed for 
correction of error. See Loporto v. Hoegemann, 982 P.2d 586, 587 
(Utah Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State, 888 
P.2d 694, 697 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231 
(Utah 1995)). 
In its Ruling, the district court ignored subsection (c) of 
Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, concluding that 
Mr. Paolone's pro se notice of appeal was "untimely as it was 
received by Judge Allphin after the defendant was convicted but 
5Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(c) provides that "a notice 
of appeal filed after the announcement of a decision, judgment, or 
order but before the entry of the judgment or order of the trial 
court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day 
thereof." 
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before the defendant was sentenced." (R. 178). The court also 
determined that by failing to "re-file a Notice of Appeal after he 
was sentenced," Mr. Paolone "failed to preserve his right to 
appeal" (Id.) and that ua subsequent notice was required by Utah 
case law and the Utah Court Rules to have been filed after the 
defendant was sentenced and not before." (R. 179). 
According to the plain language of Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 4(c), "a notice of appeal filed after the announcement 
of a decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of the 
judgment or order of the trial court shall be treated as filed 
after such entry and on the day thereof." Consequently, the pro 
se notice of appeal in the instant case was as valid as any notice 
of appeal filed within 30 days after sentencing. 
Finally, the district court's determination that Mr. 
Paolone's pro se notice of appeal in the form of a letter was 
invalid because it was sent to the trial judge rather than the 
clerk of the court was unduly restrictive and ran afoul of the 
liberal treatment to be applied to notices of appeal, especially 
those filed by pro se litigants. See State v. Valdovinos, 2003 UT 
App 432, fl7, 82 P.3d 1167; In re B.B., 2002 Ut App 82, f9, 45 
P. 3d 527; Lundahl v. Quinn, 2003 UT 11, %3, 61 P. 3d 1000. 
Moreover, this notion is contradicted by the fact that the trial 
court obviously forwarded the notice to the clerk for filing as 
12 
evinced by the file date-stamp applied to the document by the 
clerk's office. 
C. Constitutional Right to Appeal 
The "failure to provide a direct appeal from a criminal case 
implicates the guarantee of due process under article I, section 
7 of the Utah Constitution," see State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703, 
705 n.l (Utah 1985), "when a defendant has 'been prevented in some 
meaningful way from proceedings' with a first appeal of right." 
See State v. Penman, 964 P.2d 1157, 1166 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). In 
the instant case, Mr. Paolone was denied his constitutional right 
to appeal by the erroneous filing and failure by the court to 
adjudicate the pro se notice of appeal. See Harris v. Champion, 
48 F.3d 1127, 1132 (10th Cir. 1995) (establishing presumption of 
prejudice when delay in adjudicating appeal attributable to the 
state exceeds two years); Carpenter v. Young, 50 F.3d 869, 870-71 
(10th Cir. 1995) (delay of two or more years calculated from 
filing of notice of appeal). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Paolone respectfully requests 
that this Court reverse the district court's denial of his Motion 
for reinstatement of appeal time and remand the case for 
13 
reinstatement of the time frame for filing a direct appeal so as 
to allow him to pursue his right to a meaningful appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 18th day of December, 2006. 
ARNOLD A WIGGINS, P.C. 
JSco t t L ^ igg fchs 
fys 46^o^I3Bppellant 
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Michael G. Allphin 
Case No: ^ ( P ( 7 Q 0 2 Q ^ 
Dear U>T' ?OMIVVUL\ 
In response to your letter dated JMAM &{ X^X^l (& and after having 
reviewed your file and record I make this response to your question / request: 
Ojil 
i V b 1A fU truly wiaUtr- buhn^ffrio dtnwb • 
Lbxp^, fu Mm Ittffa unit h ^ro^ -b r- ' 
Sincerely, 
Judge Michael G, 
m^ 
W 
Justice Complex / Farmington, Utah 84025 / 801-454-4401 
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STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL L. PAOLONE 
Defendant. 
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS 
FOR REINSTATEMENT OF DIRECT 
APPEAL NUNC PRO TUNC and 
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
Case No. 961700208 
Judge: Rodney S. Page 
This matter is before the Court on the defendant's Motions for Reinstatement of Direct 
Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc and Appointment of Counsel. The Court has reviewed the moving 
papers together with supporting documents and for the reasons set forth below DENIES, both 
Motions. 
BACKGROUND 
The defendant has an extensive history with the Second District Court that began with 
four criminal cases against the defendant in 1996. On March 21, 1996, the defendant was 
charged by Information in Davis County, Utah, with one count of Forcible Sexual Abuse, a 
second-degree felony (case no. 961700208). Following a jury trial on June 21, 1996, the 
defendant was found guilty as charged. The defendant did not file any direct appeal of his 
conviction. However, prior to sentencing, the defendant sent a letter to the trial judge seeking: 
?.«'»£ »/,L?^ fef ,dant 's M o t i o n s for Reinstatement of D 
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1) a change of venue, 2) new counsel, and 3) an appeal of his jury conviction based on 
ineffectiveness of counsel and potential jury bias. 
On June 7, 1996, the defendant was charged by Information with the commission of 
several other felonies: aggravated assault (a third degree felony) and discharging a firearm from 
a vehicle (a third degree felony) in case no. 961700439; use of an explosive device (a first degree 
felony) and arson (a third degree felony) in case no. 961700440; attempted theft of a vehicle and 
forgery (both third degree felonies) in case no. 961700441. On July 17, 1996, the defendant pled 
guilty to arson (case no. 961700440), attempted theft of a vehicle (961700441), and forgery 
(961700441). All remaining charges were dismissed pursuant to a plea bargain. At the plea 
hearing, the defendant moved the court to withdraw his previously filed letter, mentioned above. 
It should be noted that at a hearing two days prior (July 15, 1996), Judge Glen Dawson advised 
the defendant that the "appropriate time to file a notice of appeal from that case [961700208] is 
within the 30 day period following sentencing on that case." Transcript of Proceedings in Case 
No. 961700440, at page 5, lines 15-19. The defendant was sentenced on August 14, 1996 for his 
convictions in case nos. 961700208, 961700440 and 961700441. 
On February 27, 1997, the defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the 
Second District Court (case no. 970700092), seeking to challenge both his conviction for forcible 
sexual abuse in 961700208 and the validity of his guilty pleas in 961700440 and 961700441. 
The trial court ordered the respondent State of Utah to respond to certain issues, including 
whether the defendant directed his trial counsel to appeal his conviction for forcible sexual abuse 
and whether the trial counsel failed to do so. An evidentiary hearing was held on the issue on 
June 25, 1998. At the hearing, the court found that the defendant's trial counsel in the criminal 
trial had discussed the issue of appeal with the defendant on several occasions and that after the 
discussions, the defendant indicated he did not have a desire to appeal his conviction. The court 
determined that the defendant indicated to two different courts that he was satisfied with his 
counsel and wished his counsel to continue his representation. The court entered an Order 
dismissing the petition for post-conviction relief on August 10, 1998. 
The defendant appealed the dismissal of his petition in 970700092 to the Utah Court of 
Appeals (case no. 981441-CA). On November 6, 1999, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial 
court's dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief. The defendant did not file any petition 
for writ of certiorari with the Utah Supreme Court for a review of the Court of Appeals' decision. 
On November 2, 2000, the defendant filed a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus 
(case no. 00-CV-787). The petition was dismissed on September 24, 2001 because it was not 
filed within the statute of limitations period. 
On August 10, 2001, the defendant filed a new petition for post-conviction relief (case 
no. 010700442), challenging his conviction in 961700208. The defendant alleged that a juror in 
his criminal case personally knew the defendant and gave dishonest answers during the court's 
voir dire so that the juror could place himself on the jury with the intent to convict the defendant. 
The defendant also alleged that this same juror was not a resident of Davis County at the time of 
his jury service, and thus, the juror was not qualified to be empanelled as a member of the jury. 
The defendant then amended his petition to argue ineffective assistance of counsel. The court 
dismissed the petition for post-conViction relief because the defendant had alleged ineffective 
assistance of counsel in a previous petition for post-conviction relief and because the defendant 
did not show a violation of the United States Constitution or the Utah State Constitution—the 
only ground upon which post-conviction relief could have been granted. See Utah Code Ann. § 
78-35a-104(l)(a)(2001). 
On July 5, 2002, the defendant filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus with the Utah 
Court of Appeals, pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 20(a). The Court of Appeals referred the petition 
to the Second District Court (also, pursuant to Rule 20(a)) and the petition was filed with the 
Second District on July 19, 2002. In that petition, the defendant argued: 1) that the Utah 
Attorney General committed "extrinsic fraud" against the defendant in order to deny the 
defendant's statutory right to appeal his conviction in case no. 961700208; 2) that the Attorney 
General misled the court as to trial counsel's actions pertaining to the notice of appeal by 
defendant acting pro se\ and 3) that defendant's criminal trial counsel had proffered to the court 
that defendant's notice of appeal was not withdrawn by trial counsel and that the defendant had 
indeed preserved his right to appeal, but that the court took no action to rectify this due process 
violation of the defendant's rights. The court dismissed the defendant's third argument as 
frivolous on its face. See Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(g). The court dismissed the other grounds for 
post-conviction relief cited by the defendant because the defendant showed no good cause for the 
reason his new arguments were not included in his two prior petitions for post-conviction relief, 
as required by Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-1006(l)(d) and Andrews v. Shulsen, 113 P.2d 832 (Utah 
1998). 
On January 28, 2005, the defendant filed yet another petition for post-conviction relief 
(case no. 050700051). In that petition, the defendant alleged that the trial court held ex parte 
communications with a biased juror, that the court knowingly empanelled that biased juror, and 
that his trial counsel was ineffective due to the fact that he failed to question that juror about any 
possible bias he may have had against the defendant. This Court denied the petition because it 
was filed beyond the statute of limitations found in Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107(l); because 
the defendant's cited grounds for relief were not covered by the Post Conviction Relief Act, Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-35a-104; because the defendant's claims had been previously adjudicated; and 
because the defendant failed to show good cause for the reasons the new claims were not argued 
in the defendant's three previous petitions for post-conviction relief. The defendant filed a 
Notice to Appeal this decision on September 30, 2005. The appeal is currently pending. 
In September 2005, the Supreme Court handed down Manning v. State, 2005 UT 61. 
This opinion addresses a new method for courts to follow when a defendant has alleged an 
unconstitutional deprivation of his right to appeal. Pursuant to Manning, the defendant has filed 
this Motion for Reinstatement of Direct Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc. 
ANALYSIS 
The defendant here is alleging that he was unconstitutionally deprived of his right to 
appeal when he had mentioned in the July 8, 1996 letter to Judge Allphin that he wished to 
appeal his conviction of Forcible Sexual Abuse. The defendant states that this was a. pro se 
notice of appeal and that the letter was adequate to preserve the defendant's right to appeal. 
Utah R. App. P. 4(a) states that, "[i]n a case in which an appeal is permitted as a matter of right 
from the trial court to the appellate court, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed 
with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order 
appealed from." However, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized that in certain situations a 
defendant can be unconstitutionally deprived of his right to appeal when a notice of appeal is not 
filed within the 30-day time period* and the failure to timely file cannot be attributed to the 
defendant's conduct. 
Prior to the recent Manning decision, the Supreme Courts had fashioned a remedy to this 
predicament in State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36 (Utah 1981). Johnson provided a procedural 
mechanism to restore a defendant's unconstitutionally denied right to appeal his conviction when 
a notice of appeal was not timely filed and the defendant was not at fault. Defendants were 
directed, by Johnson, to "file a motion for resentencing in the trial court so that the thirty-day 
time period for bringing an appeal set forth in rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
would begin to run anew." Manning at \ 12 {citing Johnson, 635 P.2d at 38). 
However, the court in Manning changed this procedure in order to "provide a readily 
accessible and procedurally simple method by which persons improperly denied their right to 
appeal can promptly exercise this right." Id. at 1J 26. As a result of this change, a defendant must 
make a motion to the trial or sentencing court and that court "may reinstate the time frame for 
filing a direct appeal where the defendant can prove, based on facts in the record or determined 
through additional evidentiary hearings, that he has been unconstitutionally deprived, through no 
fault of his own, of his right to appeal." Id. at ^ 31 (internal citations omitted). The Manning 
Court stressed that it is the "defendant [that] bears the burden of proving she has not knowingly 
or voluntarily waived the right to appeal.. .by a preponderance of evidence." Id. at ^ 32. 
Finally, Manning says that the Supreme Court, 
expressly state[s] that the procedure set forth here is not available 
to a defendant properly informed of his appellate rights who 
simply lets the matter rest, and then claims that he did not waive 
his right to appeal. Thus, in the vast majority of cases where a 
defendant fails to comply with the rule 4(a) thirty-day requirement 
of filing a timely appeal, or with the rule 4(e) provision for 
requesting an extension of the time to appeal upon a showing of 
excusable neglect or good cause, the defendant will be held to have 
waived his right to appeal and the claim will properly be 
dismissed. 
Id. at H33. 
It should be noted that Manning deals with a situation where a defendant pled guilty to 
crimes charged against her in exchange for the dropping of other charges pursuant to a plea 
bargain. This is not the situation presented here—the defendant was convicted of the crime of 
Forcible Sexual Abuse by a jury and did not plead guilty to this charge. While the defendant did 
plead guilty to crimes charged in related cases pursuant to a plea bargain (case nos. 961700440, 
961700441), the defendant has filed this Motion for reinstatement of time to appeal his 
conviction by the jury in 961700208. Thus, Manning is not directly on point. 
Even if it were on point, Manning requires the defendant to prove, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that he has been unconstitutionally deprived of his right to appeal through no fault 
of his own. The defendant cannot meet this burden because if the defendant was deprived of his 
right to appeal at all, it was due to the defendant's delay in properly filing a notice of appeal. 
Manning contemplates three different situations where a defendant might be 
unconstitutionally deprived of his right to appeal. 
Such circumstances would include: (1) the defendant asked his or 
her attorney to file an appeal but the attorney, after agreeing to file, 
failed to do so; (2) the defendant diligently but futilely attempted 
to appeal within the statutory time frame without fault on 
defendant's part; or (3) the court or the defendant's attorney failed 
to properly advise defendant of the right to appeal. 
Id. at K 31. It seems clear that the defendant is not bringing this motion based upon the first 
situation enumerated in Manning—the situation where a defendant requests his attorney to file an 
appeal and the attorney failed to do so. Id. The defendant has previously made the argument 
that his trial counsel consistently failed to file an appeal even after counsel agreed to do so. 
However, the defendant's current motion makes no reference to any alleged failure of trial 
counsel to file a notice of appeal with the court. 
Further, the defendant does not appear to base this motion on the third situation 
enumerated in Manning where "the court or the defendant's attorney failed to properly advise the 
defendant of the right to appeal." Id. It is true, the defendant's trial counsel did have a duty to 
advise the defendant of his right to appeal his conviction. From the record presented in case no. 
970700092, it is clear that the defendant's trial counsel, Mr. Redd, did in fact advise the 
defendant regarding the option to appeal his conviction. Indeed, the court in 970700092 found 
the defendant had numerous conversations with his attorney about the possibility of appeal and 
that the defendant concluded after each discussion that he did not wish to appeal. June 25, 1998 
Minute Entry, Case No. 970700092. Thus, the Court finds that the defendant cannot bring the 
instant motion based upon a failure of his attorney to properly advise the defendant of the right to 
appeal. 
Further, any allegation that the court failed to advise the defendant of his right to appeal is 
meritless. First, the defendant was advised of his right to appeal when he was discussing his 
conviction in this case with Judge Dawson at a hearing for cases 961700440 and 441. "[L]et me 
advise you with regard to the appeal matter, that will be in front of Judge Allphin. And that the 
appropriate time to file a notice of appeal from that case is within the 30 day period following 
sentencing on that case." Transcript of Proceedings in 961700440, page 5, lines 15-19. Also, at 
the defendant's sentencing for his conviction of Forcible Sexual Assault, the court informed the 
defendant of the thirty-day time period to file an appeal. "Now, if you would like to appeal the 
sentence the Court has entered, you must take that appeal within 30 days." Transcript of 
Proceedings, Case No. 961700208. Thus, the Court finds that the defendant cannot bring this 
motion based on any alleged failure of the court to adequately advise the defendant of his right to 
appeal. 
The only situation contemplated by Manning that the defendant can possibly bring this 
motion on is that the defendant himself "diligently but futilely attempted to appeal within the 
statutory time frame without fault on defendant's part." Manning at f 31. The defendant claims 
that he did preserve his right to appeal by sending a letter to Judge Allphin in July 1996, after his 
conviction, but before his sentencing. The letters have always been treated by the court, the 
defendant, and Mr. Redd as motions filed by the defendant pro se. 
To that end, at the hearing on July 15, 1996—a month before the defendant was 
sentenced—when the defendant appeared before Judge Dawson regarding case nos. 961700440 
and 441 the defendant informed the court that he had filed the pro se motions mentioned above— 
while he was still represented by Mr. Redd. In response to a question regarding his appeal in 
961700208, Judge Dawson stated, "let me advise you with regard to the appeal matter, that will 
be in front of Judge Allphin. And that the appropriate time to file a notice of appeal from that 
case is within the 30 day period following sentencing on that case." Transcript of Proceedings in 
961700440, page 5, lines 15-19 (emphasis added). In short, Judge Dawson clearly advised the 
defendant that his "motion for appeal" was premature and that the appropriate time for filing a 
notice of appeal was after sentencing, not before. 
The defendant has cited in his Motion various affidavits of Mr. Redd provided to the 
Court in previous post-conviction relief cases. These affidavits primarily address the issue of 
whether the defendant's pro se notice of appeal was withdrawn by the defendant and/or Mr. 
Redd in the hearing before Judge Dawson on July 17, 1996. At that hearing, Mr. Redd, 
representing the defendant, stated, "I think we have a resolution to this matter. What that would 
entail is that the motions filed by the Defendant would be withdrawn. And there would be an 
amendment to the outstanding charges, and a plea that would result." Transcript of Proceedings 
in Case No. 961700440, page 9, lines 18-22. Much has been made of this statement in the 
defendant's prior post-conviction relief petitions. The dispute has been whether the defendant, 
through Mr. Redd, withdrew his motion for appeal along with the other motions submitted to the 
court. The various affidavits of Mr. Redd address this issue. The defendant claims that the 
various courts have never addressed the issue of whether he actually withdrew his notice of 
appeal. However, this issue is not dispositive of whether the defendant has been 
unconstitutionally deprived of his right to appeal. 
Whether or not the defendant withdrew his notice of appeal, the fact still remains that 
Judge Dawson advised the defendant on July 15, 1996 that his motion for appeal was untimely 
and needed to wait until after his sentencing. The defendant does not dispute that he failed to do 
anything after his sentencing to effectuate an appeal. Under Utah law, a defendant has the right 
to appeal from "the final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea." Utah Code Ann. § 
77-18a-1(a). Utah case law has a long history of noting that a "final judgment of conviction" as 
cited in § 77-18a-l(a) means the same thing as "sentencing." "[I]n the technical legal sense, 
sentence is ordinarily synonymous with judgment, and denotes the action of a court of criminal 
jurisdiction formally declaring to the accused the legal consequences of the guilt which he has 
confessed or of which he has been convicted." State v. Fedder, 262 P.2d 753, 755 (Utah 1953). 
Further, "[i]t is generally accepted that the imposition of sentence is required for finality of a 
judgment of conviction." State v. Johnson, 700 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Utah 1985). The Utah Court 
of Appeals clarified the issue of when a criminal appeal can be made in State v. Walker, 2002 UT 
App 290, where the Court said "we hold that under Utah law a trial court must impose a sentence 
in order to create a final, appealable order." Id. at ^ 11. It is important to note that the Court of 
Appeals was not breaking new ground when it held in 2002 that a sentence must be imposed 
before there is a final order to appeal from. See Walker at ^ 11, n.6-7. 
Judge Dawson understood the requirement of sentencing before an appeal can be made. 
This is evidenced by Judge Dawson informing the defendant that the appropriate time for filing 
an appeal was within thirty days after he was sentenced. Indeed, if defendant's letter to Judge 
Allphin can be termed a notice of appeal, that notice was early. Further, the record supports the 
fact that the defendant was informed again of his thirty day time period to file an appeal. "Now, 
if you would like to appeal the sentence the Court has entered, you must take that appeal within 
30 days." Transcript of Proceedings, Case No. 961700208. 
In short, the defendant cannot prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was 
unconstitutionally deprived of his right to appeal through no fault of his own. See Manning at % 
31. The Court acknowledges the risk involved when the defendant undertook to file his appeal 
pro se.] However, when the defendant undertook to represent himself he undertook the risk that 
he would not follow the correct procedure for filing an appeal. The Court finds that if the 
defendant did, in fact, send a notice of appeal to Judge Allphin it was untimely as it was received 
by Judge Allphin after the defendant was convicted but before the defendant was sentenced. 
When the defendant neglected to properly re-file a Notice of Appeal after he was sentenced, the 
defendant failed to preserve his right to appeal. The Court finds that the defendant was 
adequately advised by the court of his right to appeal and the time limit in which to exercise that 
right on at least two different occasions—at the July 15, 1996 hearing before Judge Allphin and 
at his sentencing on August 14, 1996 before Judge Memmott. Further, the Court finds that the 
defendant's attorney, Mr. Redd, adequately counseled with the defendant regarding the 
advisability of filing an appeal to his conviction and that the defendant made the decision to not 
direct his attorney to proceed with an appeal. "We expressly state that the procedure set forth 
here is not available to a defendant properly informed of his appellate rights who simply lets the 
matter rest, and then claims that he did not waive his right to appeal." Manning at ^  33. The 
1
 Incidentally, the record is unclear as to whether the defendant actually dismissed Mr. Redd from the proceedings in 
961700208. It appears that the defendant did, in fact, affirmatively dismiss his counsel from this case but continued 
to retain Mr. Redd's representation in 961700440 and 441. As those cases were sentenced at the same time as this 
case, per the request of the defendant, Mr. Redd was present for the sentencing in this case. 
defendant here was properly informed of his appellate rights and simply let the matter rest. Thus, 
according to Manning, the defendant cannot now claim that he did not waive his right to appeal. 
The Court wishes to be clear that it is, in fact, addressing the issue of whether the 
defendant withdrew his notice of appeal at the July 17, 2005 hearing—the issue that is brought 
before the Court on the various filings and affidavits of Mr. Redd. The Court finds that it makes 
no difference whether the defendant actually did withdraw his notice of appeal or not. If the 
defendant did not withdraw his notice of appeal, such notice was still early and a subsequent 
notice was required by Utah case law and the Utah Court Rules to have been filed after the 
defendant was sentenced and not before. 
Further, even if the notice of appeal had been timely, the Court still finds that the 
defendant failed to follow the proper procedure for filing a notice of appeal. The defendant 
claims to have timely filed his pro se notice of appeal by sending a letter, expressing his desire to 
appeal his conviction, to Judge Allphin. Even if the letter can be termed a notice of appeal, the 
defendant failed to properly file such notice. Rule 4(a) requires that any notice of appeal be filed 
"with the clerk of the trial court," not with the trial judge. There are numerous reasons for this 
requirement, not the least of which is to ensure that a record is made of any filings—including a 
notice of appeal. Because the request for an appeal was sent in the form of a letter to the trial 
judge, rather than filed with the Clerk of Court, as required by the Appellate Rules, the defendant 
failed to properly preserve his right to appeal. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court DENIES the defendant's Motion for Reinstatement 
of Direct Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc because the defendant failed to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that he was unconstitutionally deprived of his right to appeal through no fault of his 
own, as required by Manning. Due to the Court's denial of the defendant's Motion for 
Reinstatement of Direct Appeal, the defendant's subsequent motion for appointment of counsel is 
moot and is therefore DENIED. 
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